What is Well-Being?
Well-being implies an evaluation. Being well is desirable and
being unwell is undesirable. Most people are likely to prefer being well over
being unwell. Thus, the meaning of well in well-being is uncontroversial. The
crucial part of any definition of well-being is the "being" part of
well-being. What is being? In other words, what is the object of the
evaluation? I propose that well-being is an evaluation of an individual's life
in its entirety. Thus, I define well-being as a positive evaluation of an
individual's life. Like any other evaluation, the outcome of the evaluation
process can vary along a single dimension from the most positive evaluation to
the most negative evaluation . Although the term well-being implies a positive
evaluation, I do not distinguish conceptually between well-being and ill-being.
Well-being is the label for the positive pole of the full evaluative continuum.
One of the major problems of the concept of well-being is that
an individual's life is a very complex object; as for example, compared to the
taste of sugar as an object of evaluation. With evaluations of complex objects
two problems arise. First, it is unclear how evaluations of more specific
aspects of an individual's life should be integrated. Second, it is possible
that the global evaluation of a life is not the same as a weighted sum of more
specific aspects. These problems are illustrated by considering more specific
aspects of well-being such as financial well-being. It is much easier to
construct or recall examples of life's that illustrate specific well-being
(e.g., financial well-being - Bill Gates) than to think of lives with high
overall well-being (e.g., Does Bill Gates have higher well-being than the Dalai
Lama?).
Thus, the main challenge for any definition of well-being is to
specify criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of information that is
required for the evaluation of entire lives. Given the complexity of the task,
this is by no means a trivial question and it is possible that it remains
impossible to define well-being. The construct of well-being may be to diffuse,
subjective, and relative to defy a coherent definition. However, I believe that
a coherent (internally consistent), universally applicable, and value-neutral
definition of well-being is not only possible, but also necessary for a science
of well-being. Without a definition that fulfills the aforementioned criteria,
well-being research will be fraught with controversies based on the preexisting
values of individual researchers and diverse measures of well-being.
It is notable that the social sciences have been conducting
empirical research on well-being for 50 years. A keyword search in PsycInfo for
"well being" in April 2008 retrieved over 25,000 references. One of
the first references is to Sally's (1886) "The feelings: Nature of
feeling." The abstract notes "Since the feelings are the elements of
happiness and its opposite, the study of them is an important part of the
science of well-being." (p. 1886). Given the long history of the construct
of well-being in the social sciences, it seems improbable that the key concept
of well-being that generated this research is still lacking. Yet, there are two
reasons why well-being remains an unexamined and undefined construct in the
social sciences. The first reason is that well-being is often used loosely to
classify any study that implies an evaluation of a life. The studies do not
claim that other evaluations are possible or that the measure used in their
study is a perfectly valid measure of well-being. The more limited focus of
these studies is evident in many titles that qualify well-being (e.g.,
"physical well-being, financial well-being, subjective well-being,
psychological well-being). Any qualification implies that findings regarded to
one type of well-being may not generalize to other types of well-being. Thus,
qualifications serve the noble purpose of allowing alternative empirical
programs of research to thrive. However, the problem of this pluralistic
approach is that conflicting research findings are never resolved. Moreover,
the main question of this article, namely how these various types of well-being
relate to well-being per se is never examined. That is, how is physical
well-being, financial well-being, or subjective well-being related to the
evaluation of an individual's entire life? The second reason for the lack of a
well-accepted definition of well-being is the failure to distinguish between
different types of definitions. The purpose of this article is to provide a descriptive
define the term well-being; that is, the aim is to elucidate the meaning of the
term well-being. An important aspect of descriptive definitions is that they
can be evaluated themselves: one descriptive definition can be superior to
another descriptive definition. In contrast, stipulative definitions assign a
new meaning to a term. Stipulative definitions cannot be evaluated because they
make no claim to explain an already existing meaning of a term. For example, a
stipulative definition of well-being may say that well-being is a life that
maximizes life expectancy. As a result, well-being can be measured objectively
in terms of the number of year's from an individual's birth to death. Although
this definition is unlikely to be a good descriptive definition of well-being,
it would be possible for researchers to use the existing term
"well-being" and define it in terms of life expectancy. Stipulative
definitions are unproblematic as long as everybody uses the term well-being
with the new meaning in mind and does not confuse it with the alternative,
unspecified existing meaning of the term. However, it is unreasonable to assume
that people will clearly distinguish between two meanings of the same term,
especially when one meaning is not explicated. Under these circumstances, it is
likely that researchers and consumers of research findings will confuse the two
meanings. In the present example, it would seem preferable to avoid the
creation of a technical meaning of well-being and to label the measure of life
years in a more descriptive manner as length of life or life expectancy.
Social scientists do not clearly distinguish between defining
and stipulating definitions or explain whether their definitions are
descriptive or stipulating. There are two reasons for this confusion. One
reason is that lay concepts are often too vague to be scientifically useful.
Many lay concepts may be defined in terms of prototypes or exemplars, and not
in terms of a logical set of criteria. In this case, it may be necessary to
create new stipulative definitions that are useful for the creation of empirical
measures. To do so, a researcher may try to create a stipulative definition
that retains as many of the essential aspects of the descriptive definition,
but adds or eliminates some aspects of the descriptive definition to conform
with requirements of scientific definitions. Different stipulative definitions
can still be evaluated and compared to each other based on their ability to
fulfill the two requirements of a good definition: the definition has to be
descriptively accurate, and be scientifically useful. For this aim, it is
essential to first establish the descriptive definition of well-being. Thus,
any theory of well-being that makes an explicit or implicit reference to
well-being as commonly understood in everyday discourse, requires a descriptive
definition of well-being.
Despite the prime importance of a descriptive definition of
well-being, few social scientists have examined this fundamental question. In
addition, most social scientists have ignored the important contributions of
philosophers to the science of well-being; with the exception of the obligatory
citation of Aristotle writings on this topic more than 2,000 years ago. My
contribution to the task of defining well-being is based heavily on the
advances in philosophy over the past 2,000 years that provides the basis for
the most recent treatments of this topic in philosophy. The main contribution
of this article is to demonstrate that modern philosophy makes an important
contribution to the descriptive definitions of well-being that provides a
useful basis for the evaluation of various stipulative definitions of
well-being and associated well-being measures in the social sciences.
Well-Being as an Ideal Prototype
Like any other construct, a descriptive definition of well-being
can define well-being in terms of exemplars (e.g., lives with high or low
well-being) or in terms of prototypes that extract common elements of
exemplars. For some constructs, prototypes can be defined in terms of the
central tendency of exemplars (the prototypical car seats five people, whereas
atypical cars may seat less or more people). Other constructs are defined by an
ideal prototype. That is the most extreme values are most typical of the
construct. For example, an athlete is not defined in terms of average fitness,
but rather in terms of the highest level of fitness. For evaluative constructs
like well-being, it makes sense to use ideal prototypes to define the
construct. For example, most people would attribute a higher level of
well-being to somebody with extremely good health than to somebody with average
health. The ideal prototype of well-being is a life with that has all
imaginable desirable properties (e.g., being rich rather than poor, healthy
rather than sick, popular vs. unpopular, comfortable vs. uncomfortable, etc.).
The definition of well-being in terms of an ideal prototype has some intuitive
appeal. Most people are likely to agree that being rich, healthy, popular,
comfortable, etc. is preferable to being poor, unhealthy, unpopular, uncomfortable,
etc. The appeal of ideal prototypes is evident in Aristotle's famous writings
on this subject when he lists several desirable attributes (friends, honor,
wealth, pleasure) as indicative of a life with high well-being
(http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/aristotle-ethics/).
However, the definition of well-being in terms of an ideal
prototype encounters several problems. First, despite increasing wealth and
scientific advances, it seems utopian to maximize well-being by maximizing
every possible desirable aspects of a life. Second, even if it is possible to
construct an ideal prototype of well-being, it does not provide a criterion for
the evaluation of a life, because it is unclear how discrepancies between the
ideal prototype and the actual life should be evaluated. Is a discrepancy in
health more important than a discrepancy in popularity? Is a discrepancy in
wealth less important than a discrepancy in comfort? Third, an ideal prototype
has to be limited to characteristics that are universally evaluated as
positive. As a result, life-aspects that are evaluated positively by some and
negatively by others are excluded, but these aspects may still contribute to
individuals' well-being. For example, being married may be desirable for some,
but not for others. In short, it is possible to construct a prototype of a life
with high and with low well-being, and the prototypes could be used to define
the concept of well-being. However, the definition would not be practical for a
science of well-being because it does not provide a qualitative or quantitative
criterion for the evaluation of lives.
A Taxonomy of Descriptive Definitions of Well-Being
A scientifically useful definition of well-being requires a more
precise definition that exemplar or prototype definitions. Numerous
philosophers have provided descriptive definitions of well-being, including the
most well-known attempt by Aristotle. It would be foolish to ignore these prior
attempts. Rather, the main task for developing a definition of well-being is to
carefully compare the similarity and differences of the various definitions and
to evaluate them against each other. The main advantage of classifying
definitions into groups is that it is not necessary to examine each individual
definition of well-being. If a group of definitions share a common element, it
is possible to examine the descriptive adequacy of the shared element. For
example, numerous definitions of well-being may include the fulfillment of
basic needs as a core aspect of well-being. Closer examination may reveal that
the fulfillment of basic needs is indeed an essential aspect of well-being.
Accordingly, any definition that includes this component in its definition
remains a viable candidate for a descriptive definition of well-being. At the
same time, any definition of well-being that fails to take basic needs into
account is eliminated from further consideration.
Subjective definitions versus objective definitions of
well-being
Sumner (1996) starts with the distinction between objective and
subjective definitions of well-being. The most common type of objective
definitions of well-being are lists of objective characteristics that are
necessary and sufficient for well-being. However, the defining aspect of
objective definitions of well-being is that they do not make any reference to
the interests, needs, values, or preferences of the individual who's life is
being evaluated. The evaluation of a life is based entirely on the possession
of objectively specified aspects that define well-being. In contrast,
subjective definitions of well-being require a reference to the individual's
own interests, needs, preferences, or desires. Well-being is not the product of
objective attributes of an individual's life, but always depends on the
subjective evaluation of these aspects from the perspective of the individual
living the life.
The distinction between objective and subjective theories of
well-being has several parallels in the psychology of emotions and values.
Biological theories of emotions tend to emphasize innate, hard-wired processes
that produce universal evaluations of specific stimuli and action tendencies.
In contrast, cognitive theories of emotions tend to focus on the fact that the
same stimulus or event can give rise to different emotions based on the
relevance of the event to individuals' goals or concerns (Lazarus). Some
theories of needs and values focus on universally shared basic or fundamental
needs. Other theories focus on the presence of individual differences in values
and preferences (Schwartz, Rokeach, Inglehart).
It is important to avoid confusions between subjective and
objective definitions of well-being and subjective and objective attributes of
lives (Sumner, 1995). For example, Aristotle suggested that "a happy life
must include pleasure"
(http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/aristotle-ethics/). Most psychologists and
social scientists are likely to think about pleasure as something subjective
because pleasure is an experience. However, in the present context the definition
of a happy life as a life with pleasure is an example of an objective
definition of well-being. The reason is that the definition makes no reference
to an individual's own interest, desire, or preference. According to the
objective definition of well-being as a life with pleasure, pleasure increases
well-being even if an individual would prefer not to experience pleasure. It is
also possible that objective attributes of a life are included in a subjective
definition of well-being. For example, a subjective definition of well-being
could specify the availability of food, water, and shelter as essential aspects
of well-being if it makes a reference to the subjective point of well-being.
For example, a subjective definition of well-being could state that the fulfillment
of basic needs is necessary for well-being. The reference to needs implies that
objective factors like food and water are aspects of well-being because every
subject evaluates them as desirable. As a result, it is a subjective definition
of well-being.
Objective Definitions of Well-Being
Objective Lists
Most objective definitions of well-being are lists. A list
enumerates attributes of a life with high well-being. For example, the Oxford
dictionary defines well-being as "the state of being comfortable, healthy,
or happy" (The Oxford Dictionary of English (revised edition). Ed.
Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2005. Oxford
Reference Online. Oxford University Press.
University of Toronto Libraries.
14 April 2008
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e87727>)
The main problem of lists is that they fail to specify the
reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of attributes on the list. This quickly
leads to two common problems of list theories in general. It doesn't take long
for different researchers to develop different lists. In psychology there are
various lists of "basic" emotions, values, or cognitive abilities. In
the beginning, it may be sufficient to focus on the similarities (fear is on
most lists of basic emotions) and to ignore differences, but at some point the
differences will become more and more salient (is surprise an emotion?). The
well-being literature is no exception. Many lists include pleasure (and the
absence of displeasure) as important aspects of well-being (Diener, 1984),
other theories make no explicit reference to pleasure and displeasure. To
resolve these inconsistencies it is necessary to examine the implicit or
explicit criteria underlying the selection of items for a definition of
well-being.
Sumner (1995, 1996) examines two principles that can be used to
develop lists definitions of well-being. One approach is based on Moore's
private ownership theory of well-being. The main assumption of the theory is
that some attributes are intrinsically valuable, good, or desirable. For
example, most people prefer beautiful things over unattractive things. As a
result, possession of the universally and intrinsically desirable attribute
beauty could be on the list, and a necessary - but probably not sufficient -
criterion of well-being would be whether a live is beautiful. One problem of
this approach is that beauty is not only an attribute of lives. In fact it is
quite difficult to attribute beauty to lives, but also an attribute of other
objects such as hang bags or landscapes. According to Moore's private ownership
theory of well-being, we would have to conclude that a beautiful handbag has
higher well-being than an ugly handbag. However, it seems wrong to assign
well-being to objects. Thus, defining well-being in terms of ownership of
intrinsically desirable attributes is too broad, and lacks descriptive accuracy
for a definition of well-being. One solution to the problem is to limit
desirable attributes to attributes that only living organisms or even only
humans can have. This solution seems unsatisfactory because it limits the range
of attributes that produce well-being. Another problem of private ownership
theory is that it fails to account for the numerous attributes that contribute
to well-being that are not intrinsically desirable or undesirable. For example,
for some people an orderly and planned life may be desirable, whereas others
may prefer a life filled with spontaneity and surprises. A definition of
well-being that ignores this possibility fails to capture the meaning of
well-being. Even if these problems could be resolved, private ownership theory
would still have to solve the difficult task of identifying the list of
intrinsically good attributes that define well-being. The notable absence of
such a list highlights the problems of this approach to the definition of
well-being.
Well-Being as the Balance of Pleasure and Displeasure
A more influential example of an objective definition of
well-being is Bentham's definition of well-being as the balance of pleasure and
displeasure (Bentham, @@@; Kahneman, 1999). It may seem odd to think about this
definition of well-being as an objective definition of well-being because
feelings are mental states and mental states are considered to be subjective
(cf. Scanon, 1993). Once more it is important to distinguish between objective
versus subjective definitions of well-being and objective and subjective
defining attributes of well-being. Hedonic experiences are subjective in two
ways. First, they are often elicited by subjective evaluations of the
environment. The same event may elicit pleasure in one individual and
displeasure in another. Second, they are subjective because they are only
accessible to the individual who experiences them. However, the definition of
well-being in terms of pleasant and unpleasant feelings is an objective
definition because it makes no reference to an individual's subjective point of
view. Even if it were not in the individual's best interest to experience
pleasure, the hedonistic definition of well-being implies that experiences of
pleasure maximize well-being.
The most common objection against hedonistic theories of
well-being is that the actual cause of pleasure and displeasure are irrelevant.
For example, it does not distinguish between pleasure derived from evaluations
of one's own life and pleasure derived from imaginary stimuli (e.g., fantasy,
movies). Another problem for the theory is that others objective attributes of
a life may be equally or even more important than pleasure. For example, the
state motto of New Hampshire is "Life free or die."
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Live_Free_or_Die), and in ancient Rome a poet was
disgusted by a people that was more interested in expensive games than in the
pursuit of more noble endeavors. This criticism coined the expression
"bread and games" for cynical policies that merely try to make
citizens feel happy without actually improving their lives. Some contemporary
psychologists equally proposed that autonomy is more important than pleasure
(Ryan & Deci, 2001). To fend off this criticism, it would be necessary to
provide a reason why pleasure or displeasure alone should define well-being.
Benthams' original reason sought the answer to this question in human nature:
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham). However,
nature - or evolution - has given human beings more than pleasure and
displeasure, and a deeper analysis of evolution reveals that nature only uses
pleasure and displeasure as tools to achieve more basic objectives like
survival and reproduction. Thus, it seems legitimate to ask why well-being
should not be defined in terms of the achievement of these ultimate objectives
(a long life with many children).
It is important to note that my rejection of an objective
definition of well-being in terms of pleasure and displeasure does not imply
that pleasure and displeasure are unrelated to well-being. In fact, I will
argue that pleasure and displeasure are critically important indicators of
well-being, although they are neither necessary nor sufficient for a definition
of well-being.
Eudamonic Theory
The most prominent contemporary objective definition of
well-being is named after Aristotele's concept of eudaimonia (Nussbaum, 2000;
Ryan & Decci, 2001; Sumner, 1995; Waterman, 1993). The main aspect of
eudaimonic definitions of well-being that makes them objective definitions is
the focus on functioning. For example, Ryan and Decci (2001) endorse
Aristotle's focus on functioning when they write "we wholly concur that
well-being consists in what Rogers (1963) referred to as being fully functioning
[italics added]" (p. 147).
Optimal functioning is an attractive attribute for an objective
definition of well-being because the function of an object offers clear
evaluation criteria that are independent of any subjective standards. For
example, it is possible to evaluate whether a car or a computer is functioning
well. In these examples, it is evident that this evaluation does not rely on
the perspective of the car or the computer because neither a car nor a computer
have a stake in their functioning. My well-being is diminished when my car or
computer breaks down, but the well-being of my car or computer is not because
objects by definition do not have well-being (Sumner, 1996).
Optimal functioning is also a good candidate for an objective
definition of physical well-being. The functions of organs are well-defined,
and it is possible to assess physical well-being in terms of the ability of all
organs to serve their functions. Indeed, Aristotle used body parts as an
analogy to support this theory. However, the problem of functioning as an
objective definition of well-being is that the analogy between cars, body
parts, and lives is flawed. Whereas the function of a car is clearly defined,
it is not clear what the objective function of a human life is. Thus, a
functional theory of well-being needs to answer a question that may be even
more difficult to answer than the question "What is well-being?"
Namely, it would have to provide an objective answer to the question "What
is the function or purpose of a life?" Without an answer to this question,
the definition of well-being in terms of optimal functioning fails to provide a
definition because a definition aims to clarify the meaning of well-being. It
can only do so, if the meaning of the definiens (i.e., the defining part of the
definition) is clear (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition). If this is not
the case, as in the current case of " the function of life," the
definition fails to explain the meaning of well-being.
The vague meaning of eudaimonic definitions of well-being becomes
apparent in the vastly different theories of well-being that claim to be
eudaimonic theories of well-being. For example, the capabilities approach
(Sen/Nussbaum) specifies a large number of activities that people are capable
of and defines well-being as a life that is filled with options to carry out
these activities. Waterman (1993) defines well-being as living in accordance
with one's true self, but fails to provide an objective account of the true
self. Ryff lists social relations as one of six objective aspect of human
functioning, but fails to explain in which way having social relationships is a
function of a human life. Ryan and Deci (2001) claim that their definition of
well-being as autonomy, competence, and relatedness is a eudaimonic definition,
but closer inspection reveals that it is actually a subjective definition of
well-being, namely a specific version of a preference-satisfaction theory.
My rejection of eudaimonia as an objective definition of
well-being, on the basis that it does not provide a definition, does not imply
that optimal functioning is not important. In fact, optimal functioning could
be related to well-being for one of two reasons. First, it is possible that
optimal functioning is a precondition for optimal well-being. For example,
Maslow proposed a hierarchy of needs and suggested that basic needs (food,
water, air) must be fulfilled in order to pursue and fulfill higher needs. The
fulfillment of basic needs is also necessary to maintain optimal functioning.
The second reason would be that for many people a subjective evaluation of
their lives is likely to be more positive under conditions of optimal
functioning. However, even if well-functioning would be highly related to
well-being, it would be a mistake to equate the two. Well-being cannot be
reduced to well-functioning because lives do not have an obvious, universal,
objective function.
Subjective Definitions of Well-Being
Following Sumner (1995, 1996), I divided definitions of
well-being into subjective and objective definitions. The crucial difference
between these definitions is whether evaluations are made from the perspective
of the individual who's life is being evaluated or whether it is possible to
evaluate lives using objective criteria that are independent of the
individual's own point of view. In accordance with Sumner's analyses of
objective definitions, I found that existing objective definitions of
well-being fail to capture the essential meaning of well-being. For a life to go
well and for an individual to have high well-being, it seems crucial to take
the subjective point of the individual who lives the life that is being
evaluated into account. This is by no means a novel or groundbreaking insight.
Indeed, it is the prevalent view in philosophy and the guiding principle of
democratic, free market economies. Despite the widespread popularity of
subjective definitions of well-being, a coherent and widely accepted subjective
definition of well-being is lacking.
Subjective List Accounts
Earlier, I reviewed and rejected objective list definitions of
well-being. The main reason was that it is impossible to defend objective
definitions in general. Subjective list definitions do not share this problem.
The main problem of subjective lists is that human beings are not all the same.
The same attribute (e.g., living in a noisy, urban center) may enhance the
well-being of one individual and diminish the well-being of another individual.
Thus, it seems impossible to create a list with attributes that are
subjectively good for everybody. Nevertheless, prominent examples of subjective
list theories can be found in the social sciences.
Lists of economists tend to focus on the fulfillment of basic
needs. Under normal circumstances, most human beings desire to stay alive. To
fulfill this desire, they need to fulfill basic needs of food, water, air, etc.
Thus, it is possible to define well-being at least partially as having
sufficient food, water, air, and adequate shelter for survival. The list is
subjective because the value of the items on the list rests on individuals' own
subjective evaluation. However, an explicit reference to the subjective point
of view is not necessary because the subjective point of view is universal.
Identical subjective points of view for life evaluations have many advantages
for the creation of measures of well-being. First, it is not necessary to
actually measure subjective preferences, which is often deemed difficult if not
impossible. Second, it is possible to assess well-being indirectly in terms of
the availability of the resources that are needed to fulfill basic needs. For
example, it is possible to determine well-being in terms of the amount of water
and food that was consumed, although the definition of well-being is subject,
in the sense that all people evaluate a life with sufficient water and food as
better than a life without sufficient water and food.
The limitations of a well-being account focusing on basic needs
are fairly obvious. Simple observations from everyday life as well as survey
results show that people want more from life than the fulfillment of basic
needs, especially in affluent societies (Inglhart@@@).
First, by limiting the assessment to basic needs, this
assessment is likely to miss many additional aspects of human lives that
influence well-being. Second, the focus on basic needs reaffirms the focus on
the negative aspects of life. Being able to avoid starvation or injury is
necessary but not sufficient for well-being. Third, the focus on basic needs
provides little valuable information in modern affluent societies, which ensure
that most citizens can fulfill basic needs. This does not mean that these
societies have maximized citizens' well-being. Fourth, indicators on the
fulfillment of basic needs fail to be sensitive to new problems in modern
societies (e.g., the consumption of too many rather than two few calories).
An alternative starting point for list theories of well-being
could be attempts by philosophers and psychologists to identify universal human
needs that go beyond mere basic needs. The most prominent example is Ryan and
Deci's (2000) self-determination theory, which proposes that the fulfillment of
three basic needs (autonomy, competence, & relatedness) is essential for
well-being. However, the authors do not explicitly define well-being in terms
of need-fulfillment, nor do they provide a formal definition of well-being. At
times, they clearly distinguish between fulfillment of the three needs and
well-being, suggesting that these are two distinct, yet causally related
constructs. "Our research now focuses on the link between satisfaction of
the basic psychological needs and the experience of well-being" (Ryan and
Deci, 2000, p. 75). If well-being were defined as fulfillment of autonomy,
relatedness, and competence needs, it would make no sense to study the link
between fulfillment of these needs and well-being because the two are identical
constructs, and something cannot be a cause of itself. Examples of this
research program further demonstrate that self-determination theory does not
define well-being in terms of fulfillment of the three needs. For example, the
authors ask "is within-person variability in basic need satisfaction
related to variability in well-being indicators?" (p. 76). This question
is only an empirically meaningful question, if well-being indicators are not
also measuring need-fulfillment. Thus, these indicators must be based on a
different definition of well-being. In fact, the well-being indicators in this
study were self-esteem, self-actualization, and the absence of depression and
anxiety. Although the authors do not provide a definition of well-being that
explains the choice of these indicators, it is evident that well-being is
defined in terms of feelings and beliefs about the self rather than in terms of
the objective fulfillment of basic human needs. Need-fulfillment only
contributes to well-being to the extent that it increases self-esteem and
decreases depression. However, to the extent that well-being indicators are
also influenced by other factors, well-being is empirically and conceptually
distinct from well-being, and the theory offers no definition of well-being nor
does it explain how well-being is related to self-esteem or depression.
A more general problem of definitions that rely on lists of
basic needs is that social scientists do not agree on the number of importance
of different needs. The most extensive research program on this issue by Shalom
Schwartz (@@@) has identified about 10 basic needs. However, the research
program also shows that the relative importance of these needs varies across
cultures and individuals. (Schwartz, @@@; Oishi @@@). Thus, while it may be
true that everybody values being powerful over being powerless, safe over
unsafe, and free over unfree, it is not the case that everybody values being
powerful over being save or vice versa. Thus, a list may specify many aspects
that are desirable, but it does not provide a basis for the evaluation of lives
because an unfulfilled need has different implications for different
individuals, depending on the importance that they attach to a need.
In sum, even subjective lists fail because they have to assume
that there is universal agreement in the evaluation of lives. This assumption
contradicts the everyday observation that people with quite different lives
both evaluate their lives positively. Whereas one individual likes a life
without children, another individual is happy with a life with eight children.
Thus, a subjective definition of well-being is impossible without an explicit
reference to the individual who is living the life.
Well-Being as Preference-Realization
Preference-realization is the most popular definition of
well-being in contemporary philosophy (Haybron, 2007). Preference-realization
defines well-being as the match between a possible live that is most favorable
for an individual and the actual life of the individual. If the preferred live
is realized in the individual's own life, the individual has high well-being.
The definition of well-being in terms of preference-realization implies that
well-being has two components. The preference component roots well-being in the
subjective point of view of individuals. The realization part emphasizes that
well-being is an evaluation of actual lives. Preference-realization is similar,
but not identical to related definitions of well-being such as
desire-fulfillment. Our concept of preferences is broader than the concept of
desires and parallel's Sumner's concept of liking. One important distinction
between desires and preferences is that desires are future-directed, whereas
preferences are not limited in time. For example, a four-year old boy may
desire to become a race-car driver when he is a grown-up. This desire may be
relevant for his well-being at age 20, but it cannot be used to evaluate his
well-being at age 4 or the well-being in his life so far. In contrast, the same
boy may have a preference for vanilla ice-cream over spinach. This preference
can be used to evaluate his well-being based on the amount of vanilla
ice-creams and spinach the boy has consumed so far. Another important
distinction between desires and preferences is that desires are by definition
unfulfilled and often cease to exist, at least temporarily, after they have
been satisfied. As a result, they fail to provide a stable point of view to
evaluate lives. For example, feelings of dissatisfaction accompany attempts to
reach a hard goal like completing a book in time, but at the time the book is
completed, the desire to do so vanishes. As a result, there is never a match
between the actual state of affairs and the desire. In contrast, preferences do
not have this property. For example, just because Jill actually has a nice
house, she does not loose her preference for having a nice house.
We also avoid the definition of desire-fulfillment because
desire has a strong affective and sometimes immoral connotation. The definition
of well-being as preference-realization is not limited to burning desires of the
flesh or the soul. It merely assumes that individual's are not passively living
lives without any interest in what happens in their lives. They have a stake in
their lives. They care about their lives. And they have preferences regarding
the things that have happened and are currently happening in their lives.
We prefer the term realization over satisfaction or fulfillment
for two reasons. First, both satisfaction and fulfillment have an affective connotation
that imply a pleasurable experience. As such it makes more sense to say that a
desire or a need was satisfied or fulfilled than to say a preference was
satisfied. However, preferences can be realized, that is my life may or may not
have the aspects that I prefer. The term realization also implies that
well-being is an evaluation of actual lives rather than my beliefs about my
life. If I prefer to be married to a loving spouse, my well-being depends on
actually having a loving spouse or not. It is not sufficient to merely belief
that I have a loving spouse. As a result, the definition implies that positive
illusions about one's live create well-being. At the same time, people may have
preferences for illusions. I may prefer to imagine climbing Mount Everest as
opposed to actually doing so. In this case, the illusion rather than the actual
state of affairs would realize my preference.
In sum, the definition of well-being as preference-realization implies
that well-being has to be evaluated on the basis of individual's subjective
preferences about their lives. The main appeal of defining well-being as
preference-realization is that the definition is subjective and allows for
individual differences in the subjective point of evaluation. Not everything
that is good for one individual is good for another individual. As a result,
the definition overcomes the main problem of objective definitions of
well-being. However, the definition encounters a number of new conceptual and
empirical challenges. We first show how our definition meets these challenges.
We then address the problems of measuring preference-realizations.
Preference-Realization Can Be Immoral
A minor problem of the definition is that the old terminology of
desire-fulfillment evoked images of rampant consumption, endless need
gratification, and greed. Many moral philosophies and religions (e.g.,
Buddhism) teach detachment from desires as a way to a good life. As noted
earlier, this is a misunderstanding that I try to avoid by defining well-being
in terms of preference-realization rather than desire-fulfillment. An
individual who wants to meditate and is able to do so is realizing a preference
(meditating over doing something else) just like somebody who wants to drink a
bottle of expensive wine and is able to do so is realizing a preference.
A more serious challenge of defining well-being as preference
realization is that individual's can maximize well-being by realizing immoral
preferences. For example, if I have a preference to own a Porsche, and I do not
have a preference to not harm others, I could increase my well-being by
stealing a Porsche. One solution to this problem is to exclude
"anti-social" preferences from the set of preferences that can
maximize well-being (Harsanyi, 1977). As appealing as this modification may
seem, it is both conceptually problematic and impractical. Well-being is not a
moral construct (Sumner, 1996). The problem of criminal acts is not that the
perpetrator does not gain from it; the problem is that the victim looses
well-being. If we define the gain in well-being by the perpetrator away, by
excluding immoral gains, we first of all loose the power to explain why
criminals would engage in criminal behavior. What is a perfectly rational, if
morally reprehensible, behavior if we assume that immoral behavior can increase
well-being becomes an irrational act that cannot be explained. Second, the
exclusion of immoral gains does not imply the exclusion of immoral losses. That
is, after an immoral act that is excluded from the well-being of the
perpetrator, the victim does suffer a lose in well-being. But in which way has
the well-being of the perpetrator decreased: namely, by making his or her life
less consistent with his or her preferences. If we allow for well-being to
decrease as a function of a stolen car, it should also increase as a function
of steeling a car. Maintaining equal definitions of well-being for perpetrator
and victim reveals that the immoral act produced a transfer in well-being from
the victim to the perpetrator. Thus, an amoral theory of well-being is actually
needed to make moral judgments because question of morality take into account
how much harm an immoral act caused (Sumner, 1995). No harm, no foul! Finally,
it is misleading to suggest that preferences per se can be immoral. Most
criminals have the same preferences as their victims. For example, they both
want to drive a Porsche. What is immoral is the attempt to maximize well-being
by realizing one's preference by means of an immoral act. The definition of
well-being as preference-realization also does not encourage immoral behaviors.
One way to align well-being with moral behavior is to instill moral preferences
in individuals. An individual who has a preference to act in a moral and
responsible manner, can achieve well-being only by acting morally and
responsible. Moral issues are also largely irrelevant for the creation of
national accounts of well-being. Because immoral acts not only increase the
well-being of perpetrators, but also decrease the well-being of victims, an
increase in immoral acts cannot increase well-being.
Irrelevant Preferences
Another objection to preference-realization as a definition of
well-being is that people have preferences about an infinite number of things.
For example, psychological studies show that a few exposures to any neutral
stimulus can create a preference for it (Zajonc @@@). It seems implausible that
realizations of all preferences are relevant for individuals' well-being. This
is not a major problem for the definition of well-being as preference
realization. A simple solution to this problem is to assign preferences an
importance weight. The weight for many preferences will be at a vary low level
that for practical purposes can be set at zero. As a result, the definition
allows for the fact that people do have a vast number of preferences, while
limiting the preferences that are relevant for an individual's well-being to a
more manageable number. Consistent with this definition, empirical studies of
well-being judgments show that people weigh life-aspects in accordance with the
subjective importance attached to these attributes (Andrews & Withey, 1976;
Schimmack & Oishi, 2005). For example, most people have preferences about
the weather (e.g., they prefer dry, warm, sunny days over hot and muggy or cold
and rainy days). However, many respondents rate weather as a relatively
unimportant attribute, and satisfaction with weather is often unrelated to
satisfaction with life in general.
Adaptation and Preference Realization
Another common objection to defining well-being as
preference-realization is the concern that people's lives may get better or
worse in an absolute sense, but fail to produce changes in well-being due to
parallel changes in preferences (Haybron, 2007). The most commonly discussed
shits in preferences is adaptation.
The theory of adaptation is based on an analogy to human's
sensory perception. For example, if somebody on a bright, sunny day goes into a
house, he or she first has a hard time seeing. After a few minutes, the eyes
adapt to the dark room and the person can see well (well-functioning).
Similarly, if somebody steps out of a dark room into the bright sunlight,
visual perception is first impaired. After some time, the sensory system
adjusts to the new conditions, and it functions as well outside on a bright
sunny day as it does inside a dark room. Adaptation theories assume that
similar processes influence individuals' evaluations of their lives. If life
objectively gets better, preferences increase, neutralizing any well-being
gains. If life objectively gets worse, preferences decrease, again neutralizing
well-being gains. As a result, an individual with an objectively good life has the
same level of well-being as an individual with an objectively bad life.
Moreover, they would both have high well-being because their actual life
matches their preferences.
Common sense indicates that there are limits to adaptation. Just
like the visual system fails to adapt to extreme conditions (e.g., a pitch
black room), there are limits to adaptation of preferences (Diener @@@, 2006).
There are many factors, ranging from innate preferences to cultural norms that
restrict the range of preferences. As a result, there are many life
circumstances outside the preference range that prevent adaptation. Once more,
the realization of preferences that are essential for survival are a salient
example. However, adaptation may occur within the range of possible preferences.
For example, an individual may have a preference to have children, but is
actually unable to have children, a student may desire to become a doctor, but
is unable to get into law school, or somebody may prefer a specific consumer
product that is no longer produced. Eventually, these individuals loose their
preferences, which increases their well-being. These examples would be
problematic for the definition of well-being as preference-realization, if it
could be argued that a life with children is objectively better than a life
without children, if a life as a doctor is better than a life not being a
doctor. In other words, if need to be able to evaluate lives from an objective
perspective that is independent of an individuals' preferences to challenge
preference-realization as a definition of well-being. As we demonstrated
earlier, it is impossible to determine well-being objectively. Thus, adaptation
is a property of well-being, but this property does not undermine the
construct.
Adaptation process may pose bigger challenge later on, when we
discuss observable indicators of well-being. For example, people's self-reports
of well-being or preferences may provide false information. To give an example,
Jill has a preference to be romantically involved with Jo, but Jo is in a
different romantic relationship. Jill's unrealized preference lowers her
well-being. After a while, Jill declares that he or she is no longer interested
in Jo. As a result, we would infer that her well-being increased. After some time,
Jo's relationship ends, and Jo shows an interest in Jill. In one scenario, Jill
informs Jo that she is no longer interested in a relationship with him. This
scenario is perfectly consistent with our definition of well-being as
preference-realization. However, in the other scenario, Jill happy accepts Jo's
overture, and Jill and Jo become a very happy couple. The latter scenario makes
us doubt whether Jill's well-being was really as high as we inferred based on
her declaration that she is over Jo. However, this is not a problem of our
definition of well-being as preference-realization. The problem arises because
we assume that Jill continued to have a preference to be with Jo, despite her
declaration to the contrary. Similarly, we may doubt whether individuals truly
adapt to circumstances like poverty, unemployment, or disability. However,
these doubts do not challenge the definition of well-being as preference
realization. They raise concerns about the possibility to accurately assess
people's preferences.
Preferences vs. Aspirations and the Aspiration Spiral
Some researchers have been concerned by the fact that objective
indicators of well-being like income or a nations' GDP suggest that well-being
increased considerably, but that subjective measures show relatively little or
no increases in well-being (Hagerty and
Veenhoven 2003) Easterlin, 1974). Another
worrying finding is that people's income aspirations are highly correlated with
their actual income. One interpretation of this finding is that aspirations
constantly increase objective life-circumstances, but that well-being fails to
increase due to rising aspirations. Thus, objective life-circumstances and
aspirations rise in tandem, but well-being fails to increase because it is
defined as the match between life-circumstances and aspirations, and
life-circumstances always lag aspirations. It is a problem for a definition of
well-being that fails to reveal constant improvement in people's lives. The
first problem of this criticism is the implicit assumption of an objective
standard to determine that lives have improved. It is possible that improvements
in some aspects have produced negative side-effects in other aspects of
people's lives. However, a more serious problem of this criticism is that it
confuses aspirations and preferences. We define well-being as
preference-realization, which is distinct from aspiration-satisfaction.
Preferences are evaluation criteria that are used for the
evaluation of one's current life circumstances or life circumstances over a
defined period in one's past life. In contrast, aspirations are future
directed. Unlike preferences that can be realized or not, aspirations are by
definition unfulfilled because the future is by definition unrealized, and
aspirations cease at the moment they are realized or people realize that their
realization is impossible. Thus, aspirations and preferences fulfill
essentially different functions. Aspirations guide future actions. Preferences
are used to evaluate the consequences of past actions. Because aspirations are
aimed at the future, thy can only promise well-being, but whether realization
of aspirations actually produces well-being depends on whether a realized
aspiration also realizes a preference. For example, Jill has the aspiration to
make $1,000,000. When Jill makes $1,000,000, the aspiration to make $1,000,000
is realized and disappears. She may now have a new aspiration to make
$2,000,000. Does this mean her well-being did not increase or even decreased?
No, her well-being is not based on her aspiration for the future, but her
preferences for the present. Is she satisfied with having currently $1,000,000
or not? Currently having $1,000,000 and being satisfied with this amount in the
present also does not mean that she does not want to have more in the future.
Thus, constantly increasing aspirations can co-exist with high well-being.
Creation of New Preferences
Individuals' preferences are limited by the range of preferences
that are available. Before the invention of planes it would have been
unrealistic and foolish for somebody in North America to have a preference to
go for a two-week trip to India to attend a wedding. Nowadays, thousands of
people make these trips every month, and it is a reasonable preference.
Ironically, the availability of this new preference would produce a decrease in
well-being because some people may be unable to realize this preference. In
contrast, nobody had that preference 40 years ago. As a result, nobody had an
unrealized preference to go for a two-week trip to India. The main problem of
this argument is that preferences can exist independent of the technological
possibilities at a certain time. The preference is not to sit for 24 hours in a
narrow seat in a noisy plane. The preference is to get to India as comfortable
and as quickly as possible. If a flying carpet could do it in 8 hours with the
same degree of comfort and safety, most people would prefer a flying carpet
over a plane. Planes were only invented and commercialized to realize an
existing desire to reach far destinations as quickly as possible. Thus, the
technological invention of airplanes only superficially create new preferences;
viewed differently the invention helped to realize an already existing
preference of traveling faster to far destinations. We are not proposing that
every new invention has positive effects on well-being. For example, air planes
also increased mobility and created a world in which close family members live
thousands of miles apart. Thus, it has become more difficult to realize a
preference to spend time with family members.
The vast differences in life circumstances and preferences of
nomads in Northern Africa and high-tech professionals in California, or between
US Americans in 1808 to the well-being of US Americans in 2008 may still
preclude a meaningful comparison of their well-being. However, the main purpose
of a national account of well-being is to assess differences in well-being
within a nation, say the United States, and changes in well-being over shorter
time periods. Although lives are changing fast, and new technology creates new
preferences (say watching Utube, or connecting with friends on Facebook), we
believe that these changes are superficial and it is possible to examine
whether these new technologies produce a net gain in well-being.
Preferences can be manipulated
A related criticism to the adaptation challenge is the concern
that it is too easy to manipulate people's preferences (Sen, 1987 cited in
Sumner, 1996). For example, the traditional Indian cast system may prevent
people from forming preferences about jobs or their status in society. The cast
system can be used by privileged casts to enjoy a better life, while the lower
casts are subjectively as happy because their preferences match the norms of
social casts.
We realize that
this is a concern for our definition of well-being as preference-realization.
However, there are several reasons why this concern is not a fatal blow to this
definition of well-being. First, the concern assumes an objective criterion to
evaluate lives. We have to assume that the life of higher casts is better than
the life of lower casts by some objective standard. Second, we have to assume
that preferences can be easily manipulated, whereas history suggests otherwise,
whether we use the French Revolution or the Fall of the Berlin Wall as an
example.
There are also
several remedies that can be used to address distortions of this kind in
subjective accounts of well-being. First, we are not proposing that well-being
is the only criterion for social policy. For example, men and women report
equal levels of well-being. This fact does not imply that society should
abolish the goal of equal employment opportunities for men and women in the
workplace. Second, Sumner (1996) proposes that preferences can be examined in
terms of their origin. Only preferences that are formed under free conditions
should be used to assess well-being.
It would be a mistake to dismiss subjective indicators of
well-being because objective indicators fail to provide an alternative. The
best approach is to consider the information from objective and subjective
indicators of well-being in policy decisions. Without subjective information, a
main concern is that the objective indicators fail to reflect individual's own
evaluations of their lives. Without evidence that preferences are
ill-conceived, subjective indicators are likely to provide a more accurate
picture of well-being. An analogy is voting in democratic societies. Unless it
can be shown that votes were bought or votes were manipulated in other ways, we
accept individual's votes as valid reflects of their political preferences.
Similarly, "a person's own view of her life satisfaction carries an
initial presumption of authenticity, and thus of authority. It can be mistaken,
even deeply distorted. But it must be shown to be so before we can have any
grounds for discounting it" (Sumner, 1996, p. 171).
Preference-realizations are too unstable because people's
preferences constantly change.
One criticism of defining well-being in terms of
preference-realization is that people's preferences can change. If preferences
would change frequently and dramatically over short periods of time, well-being
would fluctuate dramatically. Most of these changes would have little to do
with changes in people's actual lives. According to this scenario, it would be futile
to implement policies that change actual life circumstances because it is too
uncertain what the preferences in the future will be. Evidently, individuals'
preferences change over time. The preferences of a 4-year old are different
from the preferences of a 40-year old. These individual changes over the
life-span do not undermine the value of national accounts, as long as the
preferences of 4-year olds remain constant from generation to generation.
Empirical research also does not show wildly changing preferences. For example,
preferences for music, food, or political parties are highly stable.
Towards the Measurement of Preference-Realization
We have defined well-being as preference-realization. To use
this definition for the creation of national accounts of well-being, we need to
find empirical indicators or measures of preference realization. We may do so
either directly or indirectly. A direct approach would require an assessment of
individuals' preferences, at least all of those preferences that make a
significant contribution to the individuals' well-being. That is, trivial
preferences (e.g., the color of bank notes) may be excluded.
The most straightforward approach to the measurement of
preferences may seem to be to ask people about their preferences. However, this
approach makes a number of assumptions that may be violated. The standard
assumptions of any self-report measure are that individuals are willing and
able to make accurate reports, in this case, reports of their preferences. Both
assumptions may be violated for a number of reasons. Prominent theories in
psychology assume that preferences may not be consciously accessible. Moreover,
it is not sufficient to assess merely the presence or absence of preferences,
it is also important to assess the relative importance of preferences. People
may be able to report accurately that they prefer freedom over being unfree and
safety over danger, but they may not be able to report accurately whether their
preference for freedom is stronger than their preference for safety. A
practical problem of assessing preferences is that people have a large number
of preferences. Even if only a small set of these preferences are relevant for
their well-being, it is difficult to assess all of them. Moreover, even if
assessments of preferences were limited to a small set of the most important
preferences for each individual, the set of preferences would vary from
individual to individual. This variation in the nature of the preferences
creates problems for the creation of national accounts of well-being.
Thus, subjective well-being indicators typically do not assess
people's preferences. Rather, they aim to assess more globally the total
realization of preferences. The major existing indicators of well-being use different
approaches to obtain empirically observable indicators of well-being. Each
approach is based on a set of simplifying assumptions. As a result, none of
these indicators is likely to provide a perfectly accurate measure of
well-being. However, the combined information of all indicators is likely to
provide valid and very useful information about well-being.
Monetary Indicators of Preference-Realization
We start with the oldest and most influential approach to the
measurement of well-being in economics. In economics, well-being is typically
called utility. Although the term utility is also used more narrowly in
applications of economic theory that are not concerned with well-being,
economic theories of well-being equate well-being with utility (Sumner, 1996).
One of the most widely discussed indicators of well-being is gross-domestic
product (GDP), and changes in GDP are assumed to produce changes in well-being.
For non-economists it may be surprising to learn that the
measurement of well-being in terms of wealth is based on a subjective
definition of well-being in terms of preference-realization. The reason is that
wealth is only a convenient objective indicator for the subjective construct of
preference-realization. The subjective nature becomes apparent when we observe
the vast differences between individuals in the way they spend their money. It
is also important to emphasize that the focus on money is not a reflection of
materialism or a desire to accumulate wealth. Indeed, the main assumption of
economic theories of well-being is that people spend their money in exchange
for market goods (objects, services, membership fees for organizations, health
care) to realize their preferences. A billionaire who stuffs his billion dollar
under his mattress (or into a stock portfolio) and lives like a homeless
person, would have the well-being of a homeless person, unless his only
preference were to be a billionaire.
Economists' reliance on wealth or income as an indicator of well-being
is based on a theory that links money with well-being. The main assumption of
the theory is that people are rational and that their choices maximize
well-being. If an individual chooses option A over option B, economists infer
that option A produced greater well-being than option B. This fundamental
assumption implies that all individuals have the maximum level of well-being
that is afforded by the options that is available to them. Importantly, this
assumption does not imply that that all individuals have the same level of
well-being. For example, an average New Yorker has the choice to drink water
from the Hudson River, from a tab, or buy bottled water. Most New Yorkers
choose not to drink water from a polluted river. In contrast, a poor child in a
developing country does not have the same choices, and may be drinking polluted
water because it is the only option available. Thus, the well-being of the New
Yorker is higher than the well-being of the poor child because it is save to
assume that given the same choices as the New Yorker, the child would also
drink purified water from a tab or bottle. Thus, a person's well-being depends
on the range of options that is available to her. For marketable goods in a
perfect market place, the range of options increases in proportion to an
individual's wealth (disposable income). The wealthier an individual, the more
attainable are the better options. Thus, wealth provides an indicator of
well-being. However, an important theoretical question is how strong the link
between the indicator and well-being actually is. It is not news for economists
that the link is weakened by violations of several assumptions of the theory.
Figure 1 shows the assumptions in terms of a causal model that
links money to well-being.
Choice Market Costs .
WB = PR <= RO <= $$$ <=
Work
WB = Well-Being
PR = Preference Realization
CH = Choice
OR = Options Range
$$$ = Wealth
Inc = Income
Wk = Work
SR-Inc. = Self-Reported Income
Choice. The first link in the model is between option range and
preference-realization. To realize preferences it is not sufficient to have a
range of options, but to actually choose on of them. Consumers face several
problems when they have to choose amongst various options. Even with regard to
a single consumer product, say a new TV set, choosing the most option is
difficult. The choices become even more difficult when consumers have to decide
how to allocate resources across several preferences. Is it more optimal to buy
a smaller house and a bigger car or a bigger house and a smaller car? It would
be foolish to assume that every purchase is an optimal allocation of money. It
is equally implausible that people are entirely irrational in their purchases.
However, it is difficult to determine how good people are in the use of money
to maximize well-being. The uncertainty about this link creates uncertainty
about the usefulness of money as an indicator of well-being. Furthermore, without
a complementary indicator of well-bieng it is impossible to test the validity
of this assumption. This uncertainty creates ample room for dissent. Not
surprisingly, proponents of the economic model assume that most people most of
the time use their money rationally. Critiques often focus on examples of
foolish allocations of money.
Market. The second link in the model links wealth to the range
of options. There are several factors that weaken this link in the theory. The
most important one being that not all preferences can be realized in the
economic market place. This problem is well recognized in economics, but
solutions to this problem are unsatisfactory (Dolan). Other problems are
inefficient markets, and the fact that some people may require different
amounts of money to realize the same preference. For example, a handicapped
individual may require more money for mobility than other people. An individual
with a vegetable garden can have fresh organic produces for much less money
than an individual who lives in Manhattan.
Input/Output. Another neglected aspect in the standard economic
model of well-being is the influence of work on income. The only aspect of work
that matters is the amount of wealth that is generated.
Measurement of Wealth
A lesser, but still important problem of using wealth as a
measure of well-being is that even the assessment of wealth is not trivial. At
the national level, wealth is being assessed with high reliability and validity
by means of an extensive and costly assessment (@@@ reference GDP computation).
At the individual level, most studies use self-reports of household income to
assess wealth. @@@ validity study of this measure ? @@@ Factors like other
sources of income, debt, and savings can distort the relation between income
and wealth.
Summary
In sum, a number of assumptions are necessary to link income to
well-being. The strengths of these links in the causal theory is not known, but
it is likely that the actual relation between income and well-being is far from
perfect. More importantly, it remains unknown. Thus, at a minimum, alternative
measures of well-being can be used to start testing some of these assumptions.
Subjective indicators provide an alternative approach to the assessment of
well-being. We are not claiming that these measures are perfect, nor do we
currently know with certainty that these measures are superior to economic
measures. However, these measures are likely to add valid additional
information about well-being that can correct biases in existing economic
indicators.
Affective Indicators of Preference-Realization
There are two processes that link affect (i.e., people's good
and bad feelings) to well-being. First, feelings respond to the realization of preferences.
Second, feeling good (and not bad) is an important preference of most people.
Unfortunately, feelings are not directly observable. The most common approach
is to use people's self-reports of their feelings as the observable measure of
well-being.
To clarify, not all emotion theories assume that subjective
experience of pleasant or unpleasant feelings exist or are necessary components
of emotional states. However, the aim of a well-being theory is not to assess
all aspects of emotions, it only assumes that people experiences pleasant or
unpleasant feelings and that these feelings respond to the fulfillment of
desires. If this were not the case, affect measures would be useless for the
assessment of well-being. Consistent with this assumption, most theories of the
causation of emotional states assume that emotions are elicited in response to
a subjective appraisal of the environment. There is also strong evidence that
the valence of the evaluation is the most important aspect for qualitative distinctions
between emotions. Emotions of the same valence tend to be seen as more similar
and to be elicited more frequently concurrently than emotions of opposite
valence. Not surprisingly, the assessment of well-being in terms of pleasant
and unpleasant feelings is very appealing and has deep historical roots
(Bentham, Bradburn, Diener, Kahneman).
Desire-Fulfillment = Well-Being -> Pleasant/Unpleasant
Feelings -> Report of Feelings
A simple comparison of the number of links between the ultimate
unobservable construct and the indicator of well-being suggests that
self-reports of feelings are much closer to the construct of well-being than
self-reports of income or even objective income for that matter. However, this
does not imply that self-reports of feelings are better indicators of
well-being. Which indicator is a better indicator of well-being depends on the
strength of the causal links between well-being and the indicator.
The emphasis on income rather than feelings can be traced to the
rise of behaviorism in the 1930s in economics and psychology. In psychology,
several researchers were developing and testing affective theories of
well-being in the first decades of the 20th century (Beebe-Center, 1932).
Behaviorism killed this program of research and the scientific study of
feelings in psychology remerged only gradually in the 1960s (Bradburn, 1969;
Schacter & Singer, 1962; Nowlis, 1965), in which psychology started to be
dominated by 'cognitivism.', which equally ignored people's feelings. It was only
after the 'affective revolution' in the 1980s that psychologists rediscovered
feelings (Bower, 1981; Frijda, 1986; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Since then the
scientific study of feelings has increased dramatically. For example, the most
widely used self-report measure of affective states has been cited over 3,000
times (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Similarly, affective theories of well-being in economics were
discredited in an influential article by Robbins (1938). Robbins (1938) main
claim was that it is impossible to say anything scientific about differences
between individuals' feelings. That is, it is impossible to say whether Tom is
happier than Peter. The strong impact of Robbins (1938) arguments can only be
explained by the prevailing zeitgeit. Indeed, Robbins (1938) himself was
astonished by the strong - both positive and negative - response to his
relatively short contribution. "This is a long story about the genesis of
two or three pages in an essay that was written some time ago, and which was never
expected to be the subject of much discussion." (p. 640). It is remarkable
that the rejection of hedonic experiences in economic theories appears to be
based on two or three pages of casual observations. One reason for the lack of
scrutiny of Robbins main claim was that the concept of utility is not essential
to many important economic problems (e.g., theories of inflation, etc.). Even
economists concerned with well-being in the branch of welfare economics found
ways to address their main problems without an explicit theory of well-being.
Thus, economists felt little need to revisit Robbins claim and for a long time
a look into psychological textbooks would have provided no compelling reason to
revise economic theories of well-being. However, today - 30 years after the
affective revolution in psychology - a large body of evidence suggests that
interpersonal comparisons of feelings are possible. It is time to replace
Robbins's (1938) armchair philosophy about the happiness potential of a Brahman
and an Untouchable in India with some real scientific evidence about humans'
emotional experiences. Fortunately, there are signs of an affective revolution
in economics (Kahneman, 1999).
Most of the debate about the use of feelings as indicators of
well-being in the social sciences has focused on the link between internal
experiences and self-reports of these experiences. However, for the use of
feelings as indicators of well-being, it is equally important to examine the
link between well-being and feelings. There are two reasons why this link may
be weaker than affective desire-fulfillment theories postulates. First, some
feelings may be elicited by other causal factors than the fulfillment of
desires. The most obvious example is that people can - and do - alter their
hedonic feelings by taking drugs that directly influence the neurological
processes that produce experiences of pleasant feelings in the brain.
Behavioral and self-report evidence clearly demonstrates that these drugs
produce pleasant experiences. It is also evident that these changes are not
produced by an altered perception of one's life. Psychologists therefore
distinguish two types of affective experiences. Emotions are intentional states
that are directed at an object (I am happy about my life). In contrast, moods
are not directed at specific objects (I simply feel happy). Using this
distinction, emotions reveal fulfillment of desires, but moods do not. To the
extent that some hedonic experiences are moods rather than emotions, indicators
that rely on all pleasant and unpleasant experiences are imperfect indicators
of well-being. However, this is not necessarily the case. One reason why moods
could also reflect well-being could be that people have a desire to feel good.
As a result, pleasant feelings are not indicators of well-being because they
reflect the fulfillment of other desires, but because the experience of
pleasant feelings is a desire, and experiences of pleasant feelings fulfill
this particular desire. In this case, pleasant feelings would be a sufficient
indicator of well-being only and only if people desired pleasant feelings, and
if this was their only desire. The main criticism of traditional or preference
hedonism is that this assumption is too strong. Studies of people's value
preferences do not show that feelings of pleasure are the ultimate motive
(Schwartz, Oishi).
The second problem for affective desire-fulfillment theories is
that some desire-fulfillments may not elicit an affective response. Some
evaluations may be purely cognitive. A large body of research in psychology has
shown that evaluations vary along a hot-cold, cognitive-affective dimension.
Evaluations of some attitude objects (e.g., foods) are primarily affective,
whereas others (e.g., political candidates, policies) are primarily cognitive
(Esses @@@). Affective desire-fulfillment theories implicitly assume that
desire-fulfillments should be weighted by the affectiveness of an evaluation.
However, this assumption seems problematic because the affective system is
historically older and evolved primarily to solve problems that most human's
encountered in their ancestoral environment. Thus, the affect system may be
biased toward problems that were historically essential, but may fail to
respond adequately to newer concerns and problems that require more complex
cognitive evaluations. Take cheesecake as an example. From an evolutionary
point of view, cheesecake with its high sugar and fat content is exceptionally
good to fulfill the basic need of nourishment. In an environment with scarce
resources it would be foolish not to eat as much cheesecake as possible - and
may be to share a bit with close others. Not surprisingly, the affect system
evolved with an innate preference for sweet taste. However, in today's affluent
societies, many people have other concerns that are in conflict with eating
copious amounts of cheesecake. However, these desires are not built into an
ancient affect system that evolved over hundreds of generations. Thus, it is
possible that individuals who follow the desire to eat large amounts of
cheesecake experience more pleasure than individuals who follow the desire not
to eat cheesecake, even if the strength of the dominant desire is identical.
The asymmetry would result merely from the fact that some desire-fulfillments
have a stronger impact on the affective system that produces feelings of
pleasure. This would be for a desire-fulfillment theory of well-being because
the theory introduces an objective aspect in the evaluation process. Well-being
defined as the experiential output of the affective system is no longer based
on an individual's subjective point of view what is good for her or him. It is
now based on the objective characteristics of the processing of information in
the human affect system. It ignores the possibility that other systems of
information processing that evolved later may lead to a different evaluation of
what is good for him or her.
It seems likely that the prominence of an ancient evolved part
of the brain in hedonic theories plays a role in the rejection of hedonistic
theories of well-being. One problem is that the affective system is more likely
to create ethical problems. However, as we argued before, we do not think that
this is a problem for a hedonistic theory of well-being. The reason is that an
individual who ruthlessly pursues maximizing of pleasure could indeed have a
life that is better for this individual. The real problem is that human beings
are probably the only beings who can transcend the evaluation of their lives on
the basis of their feelings. This does not mean that their feelings are
unimportant or should be ignored. Rather it means that humans can pursue
desires that are independent - or at least more loosely connected - to the
affect system. Thus, hedonism seems to neglect the uniqueness of humans, which
requires a unique assessment of human well-being that goes beyond indicators
that would also be appropriate for the assessment of animal well-being.
For contemporary psychologists our distinction between affect
and cognition, ancient and modern brain systems may appear too simplistic or
even misleading. In the brain, everything is connected with everything and
often cognitive processes (thinking) and affective processes (feeling) are
interconnected. There are primitive cognitive processes (recognition) and
complex feelings (guilt, compassion). We acknowledge that this is the case.
However, we also believe that there remain some fundamental differences between
cognition and affect that can create biases in evaluations that influence our
well-being. How strong did you respond emotionally the last time somebody cut
you off in traffic or insulted you? How strong did you respond emotionally to
the last news about global warming? Which of these two events has a greater
impact on your well-being?
Judgment Theories of Desire Fulfillment
Desire-Fulfillment = Well-Being -> Self-Report of Desire
Fulfillment
We end with judgment theories of desire-fulfillment.
Historically, this theory is the newest class of theories, and started to
emerge only when social scientists first created social indicators of
well-being in the 1960s (Cantril, Andrews & Withey, 1976). The appeal of
judgment theories of well-being is that the link between the unobservable
construct well-being and the observable indicator of well-being is the shortest
link. To assess desire-fulfillment, individuals are simply asked to report how
well their desires are fulfilled. These reports can take various forms. In
contemporary survey research, desire-fulfillment is often assessed with a
single question (e.g., Taken all things together, how satisfied are you with
your life today?). The assessment of desire-fulfillment with a single item has
raised concerns about people's ability to provide a valid answer to a complex
question about one's entire life (Schimmack & Oishi, 2005; Schwarz &
Strack, 1999). However, judgment theories of well-being do not have to assume
that a single item is sufficient to answer this question. It would merely be
convenient if people could provide a valid answer to a single question.
Alternative approaches could ask participants to list their most important
desires and to rate how fulfilled/satisfied they are with each one. These
responses could then be combined using subjective weights of the desired.
The theoretical advantage of judgment theories of
desire-fulfillment over hedonic theories of desire fulfillment is that judgment
theories dispense with the assumption that all fulfillments of desires elicit
an affective response. That is, they are open to the possibility that some
human desires transcend more primitive affective desires. At the same time,
judgment theories do not preclude the influence of affective processes. Many
human judgments directly incorporate feelings in evaluations if people choose
to do so because they consider their affective response relevant (Schwarz &
Clore, 1983). For example, people may say (I like pizza simply because eating
pizza elicits very pleasant feelings in them). Thus, cognitive theories are not
the mere opposite of affective theories. They are more inclusive because they
allow individuals to use cognitive and affective processes to determine what is
good for them.
So, what is the problem with judgment theories of desire-fulfillment?
Given the short link between the unobserved construct and the indicator, the
problems focus on people's ability to provide adequate reports of their
desires, fulfillment of these desires, and the ability to provide proper
weights for the importance of different desires to their overall well-being
(Kahneman, 1999; Schwarz & Strack, 1999). Biases may occur at various
states during the complex task of integrating information about
desire-fulfillment in various aspects of one's life. Examining the presence of
biases in well-being judgments is a complex and difficult empirical task. A
large portion of this book is devoted to the examination of the large body of
evidence on this issue. Here it is sufficient to say that it is possible to
examine biases in judgments of well-being empirically by means of a process
called construct validation. Our judgment theory of desire-fulfillment implies
that there are numerous ways to assess the validity of well-being measures. For
example, if well-being is the fulfillment of desires, the theory predicts that
well-being judgments should be insensitive to the momentary weather on the day
a well-being judgment is made. If a study finds that well-being judgments of
participants who were randomly selected to be interviewed on a sunny or rainy
day differ, the finding shows a bias in judgments of well-being. If on the
other hand, reports of well-being by the same individuals on two consecutive
days are highly correlated with each other, the results are consistent with the
theory that well-being judgments are based on desire-fulfillment and not on
minor events that vary from day to day (Schimmack & Oishi, 2005). We can
also examine similarities and differences between different indicators of
well-being. If two indicators of desire-fulfillment (e.g., average wealth and
well-being judgments of nations) are highly correlated with each other, it
suggests that both indicators are valid indicators of well-being. When two
indicators produce discrepant results, it is important to empirically examine
the causes of this discrepancy. In short, we have proposed a general theory of
well-being that has several observable indicators that are linked more or less
directly to a common shared construct of well-being. Empirical studies can be
used to elucidate the strength of the various links, which ultimately leads to
the creation of increasingly better indicators of the central unobservable
construct of well-being. The only alternative to this approach is to abandon
the construct of well-being and to acknowledge that public policies may have
numerous laudable objectives (wealth, well-functioning, longevity) that are
desirable for a good reasons (e.g., they promote well-functioning, they conform
to ethical norms, a majority of voters voted for it), but it would be
impossible to say that these policies actually made lives better for the people
from the subjective perspective of the people who live these lives. Any
reference to people's well-being would be circular (e.g. why did the majority vote
for this policy? Because it increases well-being. Why did the policy increase
well-being? Because the majority voted for it.) or a category mistake (e.g.,
confusing well-functioning with well-being).
Our desire-fulfillment theory of well-being and the use of
monetary, affective, and indicators of well-being is not a challenge to
standard economics theories of welfare. As we discussed, we believe that at the
level of the unobserved latent construct well-being and ultility are identical.
We also do not propose that the sophisticated indirect approaches developed by
economists should be abandoned. Rather, we are proposing that alternative
indicators based on self-reports were prematurely abandoned in the 1930s. We
show that these measures can provide new insights into well-being and have the
potential to contribute to policy decisions.